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Employment Practices Liability Insurance (EPLI) makes delegable the
damage award accompanying an adverse judgment in an employment law
case. Modem employment law imposes such damages on employers to
compensate victims and encourage compliance. Since Burlington and
Ellerth, the Supreme Court has intensified employer liability to strengthen
the incentive to curb discriminatory conduct. This article questions
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of EPLI and the newly evolved standard for employer liability, this article
then proposes a regulatory framework for resolving the conflict to the
mutual benefit of employees, employers and EPLI carriers.
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"IF DISCRIMINATION COSTS MONEY, PEOPLE WILL STOP DOING IT."'
I. INTRODUCTION
The insurance industry has introduced a product commonly known as
Employment Practices Liability Insurance (hereinafter EPLI)2 into the
arena of employment discrimination liability. This product effectively
makes delegable the damage award accompanying an adverse judgment in
3an employment discrimination case. EPLI now allows employers to pass
1. H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt. 1, at 69 (Feb. 27, 1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N.
549, 607 (Apr. 24, 1991) (statement of Dr. Heidi Hartmann, Director, Institute for Women's
Policy Research, testifying before the U.S. House Committee on Education and Labor in
hearings on the Civil Rights and Women's Equity in Employment Act of 1991).
2. Infra Part III.
3. Richard R. Winter, Supreme Court Takes Rare Look at Insurance, NAT'L L.J., Mar.
20, 2000, at B 10.
2001] EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES LIABILITY
the risk of discrimination and harassment penalties to insurance companies,
who charge a premium to offset their liability.4 Previously, employers
exclusively bore these damages payable to injured employees.5
Until relatively recently, employees had only limited ability to protect
themselves from various injustices at the hands of their employers,6
including racial, age and sex-based discrimination. Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964,7 related anti-discrimination legislation,8 and case law
interpreting such statutes9 embody the legal response to employees'
inherent vulnerability to such discrimination. Modem employment law not
only recognizes that employees deserve recourse for discrimination, but
that remedies at law are effective tools in deterring such discrimination.' °
Seeking both to facilitate recourse and to encourage deterrence, the law
imposes monetary penalties on wrongdoer employers."
The evolution of sexual harassment law evinces the importance of
non-delegable employer liability as a means of deterrence, which is
reflected in the courts' imposition of an ever-stricter standard of employer
liability. 2 The Supreme Court supported this trend toward a stricter
standard in its most recent examination of liability for sexual harassment,
the 1998 companion cases Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth13 and
4. Infra notes 187-205 and accompanying text.
5. See Simon J. Nadel, Employment Practices Liability Insurance Makes Some
Headway with Employers, ANALYSIS & PERSPECTIVE (BNA) No. 18, 66 U.S.L.W. 2275,
2275 (Nov. 11, 1997) (describing infusion of EPLI coverage into previously excluded
employment law claims).
6. Sid L. Moller, The Revolution That Wasn't: On the Business as Usual Aspects of
Employment at Will, 27 U. RICH. L. REv. 441,448 (1993).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994); Ellen Frankel Paul, Sexual Harassment as Sex
Discrimination: A Defective Paradigm, 8 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 333, 336 (1990).
8. See, e.g., Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §
621 (1994); Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990,42 U.S.C. § 12182 (1994).
9. See, e.g., Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 762 (1998); Faragher v.
City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 802 (1998); Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S.
57, 67, 72 (1986).
10. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 805-07 (noting that Title VII's purpose is to encourage the
creation of anti-harassment policies); see also John M. Vande Walle, In the Eye of the
Beholder: Issues of Distributive and Corrective Justice in the ADA's Employment
Protection for Persons Regarded as Disabled, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 897, 923-24 (1998)
(discussing the primarily corrective justice approach of Title VII and the ADEA as opposed
to the primarily distributive justice approach of the ADA).
11. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 805-06 (relying on Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S.
405, 418 (1975), which stated that Title VII's primary objective, like all statutes meant to
influence behavior, is not to provide recourse, but rather, to avoid harm).
12. Infra Part II.E; see Faragher, 524 U.S. at 802 (commenting that it "makes sense to
hold an employer vicariously liable for some tortious conduct of a supervisor made possible
by abuse of his supervisory authority").
13. 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
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Faragher v. City of Boca Raton.14 Both cases lowered the threshold for
employer liability for their agents' actions by subjecting employers, who
are vicariously liable for their supervisors' and managers' sexual
harassment, to an affirmative defense.
15
In June of 2000, the Supreme Court further tightened employer
liability beyond that for sexual harassment. 16  In Reeves v. Sanderson
Plumbing Products, Inc., 7 the Court moved into employer liability for
discrimination when it improved employees' ability to withstand
employers' motion for judgment as a matter of law." The Court
accomplished this by enhancing employees' ability to demonstrate that
employers' defenses are a mere pretext.19 By limiting employers' defenses,
the Reeves decision is another evolutionary step toward stricter employer
liability as a means of preventing discrimination.
By creating a non-delegable risk of liability for discrimination, the law
creates an incentive for employers to exert control over wrongful
behavior.20  This risk incentive is the fundamental motivator in anti-
21discrimination law. Without this incentive, the government is severely
limited in its ability to prevent or deter discriminatory behavior. 2' Despite
the need for damages as a deterrent, EPLI has created an avenue to delegate
those damages. The ability to delegate has grown both in terms of
increased insurance availability 23 and in terms of increased judicial
24recognition of the insurance coverage. In Kolstad v. American Dental
14. 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
15. Burlington, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807-08.
16. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000) (increasing
employer liability in the case of age discrimination). This article addresses a new standard
for employer liability that emerged from sexual harassment case law and has evolved into
discrimination cases and regulations. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1604.11, 1606.8 (2000) (extending
the Burlington and Faragher holdings to both sexual harassment and national origin
regulations). Accordingly, for the purpose of this article, the term discrimination will
encompass, inter alia, sexual harassment.
17. 530 U.S. 133 (2000).
18. See id. at 143 (describing the plaintiffs burden of proof and the resulting limitations
on an employer's ability to avoid the trier of fact); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 50 (describing
the standard for granting a motion for judgment as a matter of law or alternative motion for
new trial).
19. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 143.
20. Sean W. Gallagher, Note, The Public Policy Exclusion and Insurance for
Intentional Employment Discrimination, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1256, 1270 n.60, 1279 (1994).
21. Id.
22. Id.; Jane Mallor & Barry S. Roberts, Punitive Damages: On the Path to a
Principled Approach?, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 1001, 1002 (1999) (commenting that damages, in
particular punitive damages, are useful forms of enforcement).
23. Infra notes 187-205 and accompanying text.
24. See Kolstad v. Am. Dental Assoc., 527 U.S. 526, 546 (1999) (evaluating insurance
coverage for the first time in over forty years and creating vicarious liability for punitive
damages which, thereby, increases the insurability of punitive damages).
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Assoc., the Supreme Court held that an employer can be vicariously liable
for punitive damages even if the employer was not willful or malicious
with regard to the discrimination.26 The 1999 Kolstad decision increases
the likelihood that employers with EPLI coverage can delegate even
punitive damages to the insurance carder.
This article questions whether transferring the risk of penalties for
discriminatory acts via EPLI conflicts with the increasingly stringent
standards the law is imposing on employers for discrimination. In
exploring whether EPLI risks removal of the incentive the law has imposed
to control wrongful behavior, we first explore the evolving standard courts
have set for employers' harassment liability. We then describe how EPLI
has emerged and grown in response to increasing employer liability. Next,
we analyze the conflict between the law's increasing efforts to hold
employers liable and employers' newly created ability to transfer that
liability to EPLI carriers. We conclude by proposing regulatory restraints
designed to allow EPLI to exist without diluting employers' anti-
discrimination incentive.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE STANDARD FOR EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY
Until the advent of modem employment discrimination law, workers
suffering employer discrimination rarely sought recourse in the legal
system.27 With its foundation in the Fourteenth Amendment, 2s employment
discrimination law has evolved to achieve "equal protection under the
laws" for all employees. 29 Employment law's evolution as a tool to limit
employers' exercise of power30 began at the federal level as Congress
created labor relations acts to protect the activities of organized employee
associations,3' workers' compensation and safety acts to protect employees
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. See generally Dana M. Leonard, Note, Exclusivity Provisions of Workers'
Compensation Statutes: Will the Dual Injury Principle Crack the Wall of Employer
Immunity?, 55 U. CIN. L. REv. 549, 550 (1986) (referring to workers' compensation claims
in the overall context of employment claims and explaining that this was the initial forum
for employee recourse).
28. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
29. See id. Although the Fourteenth Amendment did not address employment
discrimination per se, by addressing racial inequality as "its crucible, its paradigm, its target,
and its subtext," it is the fount of the employment law's continuing evolution. Catherine A.
MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281, 1283 (1991).
30. Burton Brody, One Potato[e], Two Potato[e], Three Potato[e], Four Power,
Power, We Want More: A Thought on "Overlawyering", 71 DENy. U. L. REv. 151, 154-56
(1993).
31. See, e.g., Labor-Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 141
(1994); Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 201 (1994); National Labor
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from occupational hazards and injuries,32  and anti-discrimination
legislation to protect civil rights in the workplace.33
A. From Title VII to Meritor
In Title VII, the foundational piece of anti-discrimination legislation,
Congress turned from the broad guarantees of liberty enshrined in the
Fourteenth Amendment to address the specific issue of workplace
discrimination suffered by minorities and women.34 In two landmark cases,
Griggs v. Duke Power Co.35 and Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,36 the
Relations (Wagner) Act of 1935, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1994).
32. See, e.g., Federal Employees Compensation Act, 5 U.S.C. § 8101 (1994);
Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 651 (1994).
33. See, e.g., Equal Pay Act (EPA) of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1994); Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1994); Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994); Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA) of 1990,42 U.S.C. § 12182 (1994).
34. Title VII provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer - (1) to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex
or national origin[.]
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
Although in Title VII, Congress clearly evinces an intent to assure equality for
minorities in the workplace, there is some question whether Congress actually intended in
passing Title VII to aid women's struggles against abuses of power in the workplace. See,
e.g., Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 584 F. Supp. 419, 428 n.36 (E.D. Mich. 1984) (citing
Francis J. Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. INT'L & CoMp. L. REV. 431, 441-42
(1966)) (noting that the sex discrimination prohibition was added as a joke that backfired
when it was adopted under the House five-minute rule), affd, 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986).
But see Robert C. Bird, More than a Congressional Joke: A Fresh Look at the Legislative
History of Sex Discrimination of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 3 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L.
137, 138 (1997)(arguing that it is wrong to conclude that the sex discrimination prohibition
was added to Title VII merely as the result of a "joke"). Commentators note that the term
"sex" was added to Title VII at the last minute by Representative Howard Smith, who
opposed the bill. Id. at 150-52. By including sex discrimination within Title VII's scope.
Representative Smith attempted only to divide the bill's supporters and ensure its defeat.
I10 CONG. REC. 2577-581 (1964) (remarks of Rep. Smith). Aware of the tactic at hand,
Representative Emanuel Celler, Chairman of the Judiciary Committee and a staunch civil
rights proponent credited with orchestrating the bill's passage, argued against the
amendment, asserting that requiring equality for women would create social upheaval. Id.
(remarks of Rep. Celler). Representative Frances Bolton represented those supporting the
inclusion, wondering aloud whether, without such protections "white women will be last at
the hiring gate." Id. at 2718-21 (remarks of Rep. Bolton).
35. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). In a unanimous opinion by Chief Justice Burger, the Court
held that Title VII forbids not only practices adopted with a discriminatory motive, but also
practices which, though adopted without discriminatory intent, have a discriminatory effect
on minorities and women. Id. at 430. Griggs has been called "the single most important
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Supreme Court noted that the statute's primary objective is prophylactic
3 7
and that a financial penalty has an obvious connection with this purpose.
3
The Court clearly explained Title VII's role in motivating employers to
eliminate workplace discrimination: "It is the reasonably certain prospect
of a backpay award that 'provide[s] the spur or catalyst which causes
employers.., to self-examine and to self-evaluate their employment
practices and to endeavor to eliminate [discrimination] .. . ."39
Employer liability further evolved when Congress passed the Civil
Rights Act ("CRA") of 199, 40 The CRA of 1991 emphasized the deterrent
effect of financial liability by providing compensatory and punitive
damages for disparate treatment lawsuits brought by private plaintiffs.
41
Among the stated motivations driving the Act's passage was "the need to
overturn Price Waterhouse [v. Hopkins],' 42 which Congress believed had
severely undercut Title VII's effectiveness.43 In Price Waterhouse, the
Supreme Court held that an employer who made an employment decision
that was based on discrimination could escape liability if it could prove that
it would have made the same decision in the absence of discrimination.44
This holding undermined Title VIl's intent to completely eliminate
intentional discrimination 45
Title VII decision, both for the development of the law and in its impact on the daily lives of
American workers." H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt. 1, at 23 (1991).
36. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
37. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 429-30 (holding that Title VII's purpose is "to achieve equality
of employment opportunities and remove barriers that have operated in the past to favor an
identifiable group of white employees over other employees"). The Court has also noted
that Title VII's second purpose was "to make persons whole for injuries suffered on account
of unlawful employment discrimination." Albemarle Paper Co., 422 U.S. at 418.
38. Albemarle Paper Co., 422 U.S. at 417-21 (quoting the Conference Committee
Report accompanying the 1972 Amendments to Title VII and affirming the right to
backpay). Discussing Congress' inclusion of a backpay remedy, the Court noted that "[i]f
employers faced only the prospect of an injunctive order, they would have little incentive to
shun practices of dubious legality." Id. at 417. The backpay provision of Title VII provides
that when the court has found "an unlawful employment practice, [it] may enjoin [the
practice] and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is
not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay .... 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1994).
39. Albemarle Paper Co., 422 U.S. at 417-18 (quoting United States v. N.L. Indus., 479
F.2d 354, 379 (8th Cir. 1973)).
40. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified at42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994)).
41. Id.
42. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
43. H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt. 1, at 45 (1991).
44. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 258.
45. The Justice Department, under President Reagan, argued on behalf of the United
States that Title VII was violated whenever a discriminatory motive played a part in an
employment decision. See H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt. 1, at 46. Proof that an employer
would have made the same decision for a nondiscriminatory reason did not erase the
violation. See id.
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Congress, in response, enhanced Title VH's remedial scheme to
provide monetary damages for intentional gender and religious
discrimination.4 6  "Monetary damages simply raise the cost of an
employer's engaging in intentional discrimination, thereby providing
employers with additional incentives to prevent intentional discrimination
in the workplace before it happens. '' 7  Congess explained its intent to
bolster Title VII's role in creating sufficient deterrence: "Making
employers liable for all losses-economic and otherwise-which are
incurred as a consequence of prohibited discrimination... will serve as a
necessary deterrent to future acts of discrimination, both for those held
liable for damages as well as the employer community as a whole., 4s
Following Congress's intent to tighten employer liability, cases
interpreting Title VII have fashioned a robust and far-reaching
discrimination law designed to motivate employers to curb wrongful
49behavior. Courts quickly recognized that "quid pro quo" sexual
harassment, the demanding of sex as a condition for receiving job benefits,
46. Id. at 64.
47. Id. at 64-65.
48. Id. at 69 (citing Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 575 (1986) ("[T]he damages a
plaintiff recovers contribute significantly to the deterrence of civil rights violations in the
future.")). During hearings on the Act, witnesses underscored damages' deterrent effect on
employment discrimination. William C. Bums, testifying on behalf of Pacific Gas &
Electric Company explained that "the big impact of [adding damages to Title VII would] be
what employers do in the way of prevention .... The Civil Rights Act of 1990 Hearings
on H.R. 4000, Before the House Comm. on Education and Labor and the House Judiciary
Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights, 101st Cong. 180 (1990) [hereinafter 1990
Hearings]. Dr. Freada Klein, described as one of the foremost experts on sexual harassment
in the workplace and a consultant to leading corporations, echoed that view: "Allowing full
compensatory and punitive damages... provide[s] a stronger incentive for employers to
implement effective remedies for intervention and prevention, which I think is the real goal.
Data suggests that employers do indeed implement measures to interrupt and prevent
employment discrimination when they perceive that there is increased liability." H.R. REP.
No. 102-40, pt. 1, at 70.
49. See, e.g., Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998) (noting that Title
VII is designed to encourage the creation of anti-harassment policies); Faragher v. City of
Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998) (increasing the chances of employer liability for sexual
harassment where the employer does not have proper mechanisms in place to prevent it);
Riverside, 477 U.S. at 575. In recognizing sexual harassment as Title VII discrimination,
the Court has relied, among other principles, on the power theory represented in the writing
of Catherine MacKinnon and others. See, e.g., CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL
HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN (1979). Such theories asserted that women are treated
differently as a group because they lack equal power to men, and that sexual harassment
perpetuates the power imbalance. See id. at 1. MacKinnon therefore defined sexual
harassment as "the unwanted imposition of sexual requirements in the context of a
relationship of unequal power." Id. at 1; see also Joanna P. L. Mangum, Note, Wrightson v.
Pizza Hut of America, Inc.: The Fourth Circuit's "Simple Logic" of Same-Sex Sexual
Harassment Under Title VII, 76 N.C. L. REv. 306, 320 (1997) (recounting MacKinnon's
explanation of the power dynamic that perpetuates sexual harassment).
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violated Title VII. 5° Nevertheless, recognition of quid pro quo causes of
action represented only a small step in the law's evolution. Employment
discrimination's modem-day Concord' came in Meritor Savings Bank,
FSB v. Vinson, 2 where the Supreme Court held that Title VII also
encompassed "hostile [work] environment" harassment.53
Prior to Meritor, every circuit court of appeals held employers strictly
liable for quid pro quo sexual harassment by supervisors.5 4 The courts,
however, did not create a bright-line rule regarding employer liability for
hostile work environment claims. The Meritor Court instead held that
lower courts should use traditional agency principles to determine
employer liability for supervisors' hostile environment due to sexual
harassment.5 Such principles are embodied in the Restatement (Second) of
Agency, which provides that "a master is subject to liability for the torts of
his servants committed while acting in the scope of their employment, ' '56-
the textbook vicarious liability standard. However, because of the Meritor
Court's incorporation of vicarious liability, lower courts developed
differing standards for employer liability based on differing interpretations
50. Paul, supra note 7, at 333-34.
51. The site of the famed "shot heard round the world." Ralph Waldo Emerson,
Concord Hymn (Apr. 19, 1836), in EARLY POEMS OF RALPH WALDO EMERSON (Thomas Y.
Crowell & Co. 1899).
52. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
53. Id. at 66-67. Hostile work environment harassment occurs when harassing conduct
"unreasonably interfere[s] with an individual's work performance or creat[es] an
intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment." Paul, supra note 7, at 334
(quoting Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Guidelines on Discrimination
Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (a) (1980)). The Meritor Court held that to establish a
hostile working environment claim, harassment must be severe and pervasive. Meritor, 477
U.S. at 67.
54. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 70-71 (noting the consensus among circuit courts in holding
employers liable for discriminatory discharges of employees whether the employer knew,
should have known, or approved of the action).
55. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72. The Meritor Court relied upon RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 219 (1958), which states:
(1) A master is subject to liability for the torts of his servants committed while
acting in the scope of their employment.
(2) A master is not subject to liability for the torts of his servants acting outside
the scope of their employment, unless:
(a) the master intended the conduct or the consequences, or
(b) the master was negligent or reckless, or
(c) the conduct violated a non-delegable duty of the master, or
(d) the servant purported to act or to speak on behalf of the principal and
there was reliance upon apparent authority, or he was aided in
accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency relation.
56. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, § 219.
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of agency principles. 7 Inevitably, even courts using similar analyses
reached conflicting conclusions. 8
B. Burlington and Faragher
In Burlington and Faragher, two cases decided on the same day in
1998,' 9 the Supreme Court attempted to resolve some of the disparity over
the standard for employer liability that arose following Meritor.60 The
Court stated that the terms "quid pro quo" and "hostile environment" were
not controlling for purposes of determining employer liability.6' The Court
reasoned that the determinative factor, which those labels encompassed,
was whether or not a "tangible employment action" had occurred.62
57. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 785-86 ("While following our admonition to find guidance in
the common law of agency, as embodied in the Restatement, the Courts of Appeals have
adopted different approaches."). Circuit court decisions prior to Faragher provide examples
of varying standards for employer liability based on different interpretations of agency
principles. See, e.g., Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 112 F.3d 1437, 1446 (10th Cir. 1997),
vacated by 524 U.S. 947 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 111 F.3d 1530, 1535 (11 th
Cir. 1997) (en banc); Gary v. Long, 59 F.3d 1391, 1397-98 (D.C. Cir. 1995), cert. denied,
516 U.S. 1011 (1995); Karibian v. Columbia Univ., 14 F.3d 773, 780 (2d Cir. 1994).
58. Compare Dinkens v. Charoen Pokphand USA, Inc., 133 F. Supp. 2d 1254, 1267
(M.D. Ala. 2001) (holding the employer liable because the totality of circumstances created
an environment that could have led a reasonable employee to think that the supervisor was
acting under his authority in harassing her), and Varley v. Superior Chevrolet Auto. Co.,
No. CIV.A. 96-2119-EEO, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4510, at *44 (D. Kan. Mar. 21,
1997)(denying summary judgment for the defendants because the fact that it had an anti-
sexual harassment policy was not dispositive), with Gary, 59 F.3d at 1398 (refusing to
impose liability on the employer because it had a policy against sexual harassment that
employees should have known about and understood).
59. The Court decided these cases on June 26, 1998. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth,
524 U.S. 742, 742 (1998); Faragher, 524 U.S. at 775.
60. Burlington, 524 U.S. at 752-53; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 780.
61. Burlington, 524 U.S. at 754. The Supreme Court stated that, although "[clases
based on threats which are carried out are referred to often as quid pro quo cases, as distinct
from bothersome attentions or sexual remarks that are sufficiently severe or pervasive to
create a hostile work environment." Id. at 751 (emphasis in original). The Court also noted
that the terms "quid pro quo" and "hostile work environment" do not appear in Title VII.
Id. at 752. The Court noted that when used in Meritor, the terms served a specific and
limited purpose-"to instruct that Title VII is violated by either explicit or constructive
alterations in the terms or conditions of employment and to explain the latter must be severe
or pervasive." Id.
62. Burlington, 524 U.S. at 753-54; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807. The Court stated:
To the extent... [that the terms] illustrate the distinction between cases
involving a threat which is carried out and offensive conduct in general, the
terms are relevant .... When a plaintiff proves that a tangible employment
action resulted from a refusal to submit to a supervisor's sexual demands, he or
she establishes that the employment decision itself constitutes a change in the
terms and conditions of employment that is actionable under Title VII. For any
sexual harassment preceding the employment decision to be actionable,
2001] EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES LIABILITY
Relying on agency principles, the Court held that employers are vicariously
liable for a supervisor's sexual harassment.63 If the harassment did not
culminate in a tangible employment action, the employer might have an
affirmative defense.64 If a tangible employment action resulted, the defense
would be unavailable.
The question certified in Burlington was whether an employee who
refuses a supervisor's unwelcome and threatening sexual advances, yet
suffers no adverse, tangible job consequences, can recover against the
employer without showing the employer's negligence.6 In other words,
can an employee recover without showing that the employer "knew or
should have known" of the harassment?67 Ellerth, a salesperson in one of
Burlington's divisions, claimed she was sexually harassed by her
supervisor who repeatedly made offensive sexual remarks and touched
681her. Moreover, three incidents could have been construed as threats to her
tangible job benefits. 69 Although the offensive remarks were continual, the
threats were never carried out, and Ellerth received promotions during her
however, the conduct must be severe or pervasive.
Burlington, 524 U.S. at 753-54.
63. Burlington, 524 U.S. at 764-65; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807. The Court noted that
even though it made significant amendments to Title VII after Meritor, Congress did not
alter that case's holding that agency principles should guide employer liability. Burlington,
524 U.S. at 764. Examining RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219, the Court noted
that "[t]he general rule is that sexual harassment by a supervisor is not conduct within the
scope of employment." Id. at 757. The Court concluded that harassment such as that
engaged in by the supervisors in Burlington should be considered outside the scope of
employment. Id. Otherwise, such harassment would also be within the scope of co-
employees employment, rendering vicarious liability rather than negligence the standard for
co-employee harassment. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 800.
64. Burlington, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; infra notes 58-62 and
accompanying text.
65. Burlington, 524 U.S. at 754; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807. Noting that "[elvery
Federal Court of Appeals to have considered the question has found vicarious liability when
a discriminatory act results in a tangible employment action," the Burlington Court reasoned
that this rule "reflects a correct application of the aided in the agency relation standard."
Burlington, 524 U.S. at 760-61. When a supervisor takes a tangible employment action
against the subordinate, according to the Court, "there is assurance the injury could not have
been inflicted absent the agency relation." Id. at 761-62. Therefore, "[w]hatever the exact
contours of the aided in the agency relation standard, its requirements will always be met
when a supervisor takes a tangible employment action against a subordinate." Id. at 762-63.
66. Burlington, 524 U.S. at 746-47.
67. See id.
68. Id. at 747-48.
69. Id. The three incidents include Ellerth's supervisor remarking "you know, Kim, I
could make your life very hard or very easy at Burlington" after she failed to respond to an
alleged advance; that Ellerth was not "loose enough" when her supervisor considered her for
a promotion and then warned that her future coworkers appreciate "pretty butts/legs"; and
that her supervisor later remarked "are you wearing shorter skirts yet, Kim, because it would
make your job a whole heck of a lot easier." Id. at 748.
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employment. °
The district court granted summary judgment to Burlington.71 During
her tenure at Burlington, Ellerth did not inform anyone in authority about
her supervisor's conduct, despite knowing Burlington had a policy against
sexual harassment.72  The court found that, although the supervisor's
behavior was severe and pervasive enough to create a hostile work
environment, Burlington neither knew nor should have known about the
conduct.73 The court noted that Ellerth's claim was framed as a hostile
work environment complaint but had a quid pro quo component. 74
Although the court acknowledged that an employer faces vicarious liability
for quid pro quo harassment, it nevertheless applied a negligence standard
because the quid pro quo component merely contributed to the overall
hostile work environment.75
The Seventh Circuit en banc reversed, producing eight separate
opinions and no controlling rationale concerning employer liability.76 The
majority agreed that Ellerth's claim could be categorized as one of quid pro
quo harassment, even though she had received promotions and suffered no
other tangible job retaliation.77 Yet the court could not reach a consensus
on the standard of liability for such a claim.
On appeal, the Supreme Court stated that while "[c]ases based on
threats which are carried out are referred to often as quid pro quo cases, as
distinct from bothersome attentions or sexual remarks that are sufficiently
severe or pervasive to create a hostile work environment, s78 the terms "quid
pro quo" and "hostile work environment" do not appear in Title VII.79 The
Court noted that when used "[i]n Meritor, the terms served a specific and
limited purpose... to instruct that Title VII is violated by either explicit or
constructive alterations in the terms or conditions of employment and to
explain the latter must be severe or pervasive. ' The Court stated that
although Meritor had not used the terms to establish a standard for
employer liability, lower courts following Meritor began to use the terms to
establish such a standard with employers subject to vicarious liability for
70. Id. at 750.
71. Ellerth v. Burlington Industries, Inc., 912 F. Supp. I101 (N.D. Ill. 1996), aff'd in
part and rev'd in part, sub nom., Jansen v. Packaging Corp. of Am., 123 F.3d 490 (7th Cir.
1997), afT d, 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
72. Burlington, 524 U.S. at 748.
73. Ellerth, 912 F. Supp. at 1101.
74. Id. at 1114.
75. Id. at 1117.
76. Jansen, 123 F.3d at 490.
77. Id. at 494; Burlington, 524 U.S. at 750.
78. Burlington, 524 U.S. at 751.
79. Id. at 752.
80. Id.
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quid pro quo claims."'
The Court concluded:
To the extent they illustrate the distinction between cases
involving a threat which is carried out and offensive conduct in
general, the terms are relevant .... When a plaintiff proves that a
tangible employment action resulted from a refusal to submit to a
supervisor's sexual demands, he or she establishes that the
employment decision itself constitutes a change in the terms and
conditions of employment that is actionable under Title VII. For
any sexual harassment preceding the employment decision to be
actionable, however, the conduct must be severe or pervasive.82
Beyond this distinction, however, the Court held that agency
principles "and not the categories quid pro quo and hostile work
environment, will be controlling on the issue of vicarious liability."83
By examining the issue using the "aided in the agency standard" to
determine employer liability, the Court held that the standard required more
than the employment relation alone. 4  Otherwise, employers would be
subject to vicarious liability not only for all supervisor harassment, but also
for co-worker harassment.85 This result would be contrary to both
81. Id. at 752-53. (citing Davis v. Sioux City, 115 F.3d 1365, 1367 (8th Cir. 1997);
Nichols v. Frank, 42 F.3d 503, 513-14 (9th Cir. 1994); Bouton v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 29
F.3d 103, 106-07 (3rd Cir. 1994); Sauers v. Salt Lake County, 1 F.3d 1122, 1127 (10th Cir.
1993); Kauffman v. Allied Signal, Inc., 970 F.2d 178, 185-86 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. denied,
506 U.S. 1041 (1992); Steele v. Offshore Shipbuilding, Inc., 867 F.2d 1311, 1316 (1 lth Cir.
1989).
82. Burlington, 524 U.S. at 753-54.
83. Id. at 754. The Court noted that even though it made significant amendments to
Title VII after Meritor, Congress did not alter that case's holding that agency principles
should guide employer liability. Id. at 763-64. The Court examined section 219 of the
Restatement (Second) of Agency, which is detailed in note 55 supra. Id. at 759. The Court
noted that the negligence standard under section 219(2)(b) of the Restatement-wherein an
employer is liable even if he or she knew or should have known about the conduct and
failed to stop it--sets a minimum standard for employer liability under Title VII." Id.
Because Ellerth argued that employers should be vicariously liable for supervisors' acts,
however, the Court examined section 219(2)(d) of the Restatement of Agency. Id. at 759.
This section imposes "vicarious liability for intentional torts committed by an employee
when the employee uses apparent authority (the apparent authority standard), or when the
employee 'was aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency relation."' Id.
Reasoning that the "apparent authority [standard] is relevant where the agent purports to
exercise a power which he or she does not have, as distinct from where the agent threatens
to misuse actual power," the Court found apparent authority analysis inappropriate unless "it
is alleged there is a false impression that the actor was a supervisor, when he in fact was
not." Id. Therefore, the Court found that the "aided in the agency standard" was the proper
analysis when a party seeks to impose vicarious liability based on an agent's misuse of
delegated authority. Id. at 759-60.
84. Id. at 760.
85. Id. (noting that the "aided in the agency" standard requires the existence of more
than the employment relation itself.)
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Meritor's holding that employers are not automatically liable for
supervisor's sexual harassment and to precedent that establishes a
negligence standard for co-worker harassment.86
The Court recognized that "[e]very Federal Court of Appeals to have
considered the question has found vicarious [employer] liability when a
discriminatory act results in a tangible employment action. 8s  The
Burlington Court reasoned that this rule correctly applies agency
principles.88 When a supervisor takes a tangible employment action against
the subordinate, "there is assurance the injury could not have been inflicted
absent the agency relation." 89  The resulting standard created by the
Burlington Court's rationale is that employer liability attaches whenever a
supervisor takes a tangible employment action against a subordinate. 90
Where the agency relationship aids in the commission of supervisor
harassment which does not culminate in a tangible employment action,
however, application of the liability standard is made more difficult. The
Court recognized Title VII's goal of encouraging the creation of anti-
harassment policies and grievance mechanisms, and reasoned that "[w]ere
employer liability to depend in part on an employer's effort to create such
procedures, it would effect Congress' intention to promote conciliation
rather than litigation." 91 The Court, therefore, held that an employer is
vicariously liable for a supervisor's sexual harassment that creates a hostile
92environment. When no tangible employment action is taken, however, an
employer may raise an affirmative defense.3
The affirmative defense has two elements: "(a) that the employer
exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually
harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed
to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by
the employer or to avoid harm otherwise. 9 4 In Burlington, the Court
remanded so that "[g]iven [its] explanation that the labels quid pro quo and
hostile work environment are not controlling for purposes of establishing
86. See id. (citing McKenzie v. Ill. Dept. of Transp., 92 F.3d 473, 480 (7th Cir. 1996)
(sex discrimination); Blankenship v. Parke Care Ctrs., Inc., 123 F.3d 868, 872 (6th Cir.
1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1110 (1998) (sex discrimination); Daniels v. Essex Group,
Inc., 937 F.2d 1264, 1273 (7th Cir. 1991) (race discrimination); 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 l(d)
(1997) ("knows or should have known" standard of liability for cases of harassment
between "fellow employees")); see also Fleenor v. Hewitt Soap Co., 81 F.2d 611, 621 (6th
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 863 (1996).
87. Id. at 760.
88. Id. at761.
89. Id. at 761-62.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 764.
92. Id. at 765.
93. Id.
94. Id.
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employer liability," Ellerth would "have an adequate opportunity to prove
she has a claim for which Burlington is liable.
95
Faced with similar claims, the Court adopted the same holding in
Faragher as in Burlington, and stated that "an employer is vicariously
liable for actionable discrimination caused by a supervisor, but subject to
an affirmative defense looking to the reasonableness of the employer's
conduct as well as that of a plaintiff victim.
96
Beth Ann Faragher, who had been employed as an ocean lifeguard for
the Marine Safety Section of the Parks and Recreation Department of the
City of Boca Raton, Florida, brought an action against the city and her
immediate supervisors.97 Faragher claimed that her supervisors created a
"sexually hostile atmosphere" by repeatedly subjecting Faragher and other
female lifeguards to uninvited and offensive touching, lewd remarks, and
offensive terms.98 Faragher also claimed that one supervisor once said that
he would never promote a woman to the rank of lieutenant and that another
said, "Date me or clean the toilets for a year."99  The district court
concluded that the supervisors' conduct altered the conditions of Faragher's
employment and constituted an abusive working environment.00 The court
ruled that among other bases for liability, the city was liable under
traditional agency principles because the supervisors were acting as its
95. Id. at 766 (emphasis in original). Joined by Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas wrote in
dissent that the majority's rule would create different standards for employer liability in
sexually and racially hostile work environment cases, and argued that the standard should be
the same in both instances: "An employer should be liable if, and only if, the plaintiff proves
that the employer was negligent in permitting the supervisor's conduct to occur." Id. at 767
(Thomas, J., dissenting). The dissent notes that negligence remains the rule for racially
hostile work environment cases and agrees that a supervisor's creation of a hostile work
environment is neither within the scope of his employment, nor part of his apparent
authority. Id. at 769. Finally, the dissent notes that the majority's affirmative defense gives
little guidance on how employers can avoid vicarious liability and how lower courts should
rule on motions for summary judgment. Id. at 773. The dissent, therefore, states, "The
Court's holding does guarantee one result: There will be more and more litigation to clarify
applicable legal rules .... Id. at 774.
The EEOC issued guidelines in an attempt to clarify the conflicting standards between
sexual harassment and other hostile environment claims recognized by the dissent. 29
C.F.R. §§ 1604.11, 1606.8 (2000). The EEOC amended its guidelines in response to the
Burlington and Faragher holdings. 29 C.F.R. § app. 1604.11 (2000). Notably, the EEOC
did not limit its amendments to the sexual harassment regulation. Instead it extended the
BurlingtonlFaragher standard for employer liability into national origin regulations as well.
29 C.F.R. § 1606.8 (2000).
96. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 780.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 864 F. Supp. 1552, 1562 (S.D. Fla. 1994), affd in
part and rev'd in part, Ill F.3d 1530 (11th Cir. 1997) (en banc), rev'd, 524 U.S. 775
(1998).
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agents when they committed the harassing acts.1°1
A panel of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the
judgment against the city, ruling that the supervisors were not acting within
the scope of their employment when they engaged in the harassment, that
they were not aided in their actions by the agency relationship, and that the
city had no constructive knowledge of the harassment. 10 2 In a seven to five
en banc decision, the full court of appeals adopted the panel's
conclusion. 10 3 Relying on Meritor, the court held that agency principles
determine an employer's liability.' 4  Applying these principles, the
Eleventh Circuit first classified the supervisors' harassment as outside the
scope of their employment.'0 5  Next, the court determined that the
supervisors' agency relationship did not assist them in perpetrating their
harassment because "traditional agency law... requires something more
than a mere combination of the agency relationship and improper conduct
by the agent.' 0 6 Because neither supervisor threatened to fire or demote
Faragher, the court concluded that their agency relationship did not
facilitate their harassment.0 7
The Supreme Court disagreed. Although it adopted the same holding
in both Faragher and Burlington, the Court in Faragher began its analysis
by relying on Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.08 The Harris court relied on
Meritor and held that "a sexually objectionable environment must be both
objectively and subjectively offensive, one that a reasonable person would
find hostile or abusive, and one that the victim in fact did perceive to be
so."''1 9 Courts must determine whether an environment is sufficiently
hostile or abusive by "looking at all the circumstances," including the
"frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is
physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and
whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work
performance."'. 0 Under this rule, the Court held that "conduct must be
extreme to amount to a change in the terms and conditions of
employment."'' 1 The Court found it unsurprising that "in many [cases], the
issue has been joined over the sufficiency of the abusive conditions, not the
101. Id. at 1564.
102. Faragher, I11 F.3d at 1538.
103. Id. at 1534-35.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1536.
106. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 785 (citing Faragher, 111 F.3d at 1537).
107. Faragher, 111 F.3dat 1530.
108. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 787 (citing Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993)).
109. Id. at 787.
110. Id. at 787-88 (citing Harris, 510 U.S. at 23).
111. Id. at788.
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standards for determining an employer's liability for them."
' 12
Reviewing previous holdings, the Court recognized that employers
were liable for supervisors' discrimination either directly due to actual
knowledge of harassment, which the employer has done nothing to stop, or
vicariously for discriminatory employment actions with tangible results.
The Court reiterated Meritor's dictate that general agency principles
determine employer liability.11 3 Meritor's holding that an employer is not
automatically liable for harassment by a supervisor remained intact. The
Faragher Court, nonetheless, recognized the tension between the new
vicarious liability rule and Meritor.14 The Court offered two alternatives
to alleviate the tension, "one being to require proof of some affirmative
invocation of that authority by the harassing supervisor, and the other being
to recognize an affirmative defense to liability in some circumstances, even
when a supervisor has created the actionable environment."' 5 The Court
concluded that the second alternative, which allows for an affirmative
defense, best fit within the principle of vicarious liability for harm caused
by a supervisor, as well as Title VII's policies of encouraging employer
forethought and action on behalf of objecting employees.
16
The outcome in Faragher, as in Burlington, is a new rule of liability:
An employer is vicariously liable for a supervisor's sexual harassment that
creates a hostile environment. When no tangible employment action is
taken, an employer may raise a two-pronged affirmative defense that
includes the employer's reasonable care to prevent and promptly correct
harassment and the employee's unreasonable failure to avoid harm. No
affirmative defense is available when the supervisor's harassment
culminates in a tangible employment action.
11 7
112. Id. at788-89.
113. Id. at 800. The Faragher Court concluded that harassment by supervisors should be
considered outside the scope of employment because otherwise such harassment would also
be within the scope of co-employees employment, rendering vicarious liability rather than
negligence the standard for co-employee harassment. Id.
114. Id. at 794-95.
115. Id. at 804.
116. Id. at 807.
117. Id. In both cases, the Court stated that proof of an employer's anti-harassment
policy with complaint procedure suitable to the employment circumstances is not necessary,
but may be a factor, in raising the defense. Id. Furthermore, showing an unreasonable
failure to use any complaint procedure provided by the employer is not the only means of
satisfying the second prong, but such a demonstration will normally suffice. Id. at 808.
Applying the newly established rule, the Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit, finding not
only that the supervisors' conduct was actionable harassment by a supervisor, but that the
city could not raise the affirmative defense because it "had entirely failed to disseminate its
policy against sexual harassment among the beach employees." Id. It also noted "the City's
policy did not include any assurance that the harassing supervisors could be bypassed in
registering complaints." Id. The Court thus held that the city did not exercise reasonable
care to prevent the supervisors' harassing conduct. Id. at 809.
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C. Post-Burlington/Faragher Interpretations of Employer Liability
Several circuit courts of appeals have considered employer liability for
discrimination since 1998. Every circuit court that has addressed employer
liability has acknowledged that the Burlington/Faragher vicarious liability
rule applies by overruling precedent applying strict liability or negligence
standards," 8 thus illustrating courts' increasing efforts to hold employers
liable." 9 Although some courts continue to use the quid pro quo and
hostile environment labels, most courts have expressly acknowledged that
the vicarious liability rule "largely eliminated the distinction between
hostile working environment claims and quid pro quo claims, focusing
instead on the presence or absence of tangible adverse employment
actions."'"2 In the absence of tangible employment action, the focus is the
affirmative defense.' 2' It is, therefore, worthwhile to examine the
118. See, e.g., Rubidoux v. Colo. Mental Health Inst., 173 F.3d 1291, 1296 (10th Cir.
1999) (reversing summary judgment for plaintiff because strict liability no longer applied,
even in quid pro quo cases, and remanding for consideration of employer's affirmative
defenses); Williams v. Gen. Motors Corp., 187 F.3d 553, 561 (6th Cir. 1999)
(acknowledging that plaintiffs need not demonstrate that a supervisor's actions were
foreseeable and that "employers now have an affirmative duty to prevent sexual
harassment").
119. See supra notes 54-59 and accompanying text. The Sixth Circuit in Gen. Motors
Corp. acknowledged that plaintiffs need not demonstrate a supervisor's actions were
foreseeable and that "employers now have an affirmative duty to prevent sexual
harassment." Gen. Motors Corp., 187 F.3d at 561. Similarly, the Third Circuit in Hurley v.
Atlantic City Police Dept., 174 F.3d 95 (3d Cir. 1999), held that the existence of a sexual
harassment policy is no longer an absolute defense to liability. Id. at 118.
120. Hurley, 174 F.3d at 120 (emphasis in original). For example, the Fifth Circuit in
Watts v. Kroger Co., 170 F.3d 505 (5th Cir. 1999), noted that after Burlington and
Faragher, attaching either the quid pro quo or hostile environment label to the claim "in a
sense prejudges the result," and reasoned that "it is more accurate to generically describe the
claim as one of sexual harassment, and wait until deciding" whether or not a tangible
employment action exists before labeling the claim. Id. at 509 n.3.
121. Hurley, 174 F.3d at 118. Lower courts in post-Burlington and Faragher cases have
also considered issues including the scope of vicarious liability. See, e.g., Gen. Motors
Corp., 187 F.3d at 562 (analyzing the plaintiffs claim that her supervisor and co-workers
created a hostile environment by engaging in several incidents of inappropriate sexual and
anti-female comments and demeaning treatment, and whether the court must "consider
harassment by all perpetrators combined when analyzing whether a plaintiff has alleged the
existence of a hostile work environment"); Deffenbaugh-Williams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
156 F.3d 581, 592-93 (5th Cir. 1998), (extending Burlington and Faragher reasoning to
allow vicarious liability for punitive damages); see also, e.g., Todd v. Ortho Biotech, Inc.,
175 F.3d 595, 598-600 (8th Cir. 1999) (where the plaintiff was sexually assaulted, reasoning
that portions of the Burlington and Faragher opinions cast doubt on the presumption that "a
single severe act of sexual harassment can, without more, constitute a hostile work
environment"). But see Dudley v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 166 F.3d 1317, 1323 n.8 (11 th Cir.
1999) (declining to follow the Fifth Circuit's lead on punitive damages with vicarious
liability and noting that "Faragher, which is not about punitive damages, [should not]
overrule... pre-Faragher punitive damages precedent" requiring that an employer must be
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implementation of the new employer liability standard both when tangible
employment action is present and when it is not.
1. The Presence of Tangible Adverse Employment Action
The first determination courts make is what constitutes a tangible
adverse employment action. In Dedner v. Oklahoma,'22 the plaintiff
brought a quid pro quo sexual harassment claim against the State of
Oklahoma. She alleged that she suffered a tangible employment action
because her ability to have days off from work on weekends was
conditioned on her willingness to have sex with her manager.1 23 The
federal district court held that although the Supreme Court did not
specifically define a "tangible employment action" it did state that such an
action "constitutes... a significant change in benefits."' 24 The Dedner
court determined that the refusal to allow an employee to have specified
days off from work does not amount to a significant change in employment
status and was simply an inconvenience to the employee.'25
In the Eleventh Circuit, the court assumed the existence of a tangible
employment action when a complaint was based on the plaintiff's
termination.12 6  The Eleventh Circuit nevertheless found no Title VII
violation. 27 The court reasoned that the plaintiff had not established "a
causal link between" her harasser's discriminatory animus and the
employment action, concluding that this was not a "cat's-paw case." 2 In
a "cat's-paw case" the decisionmaker acts in accordance with the harasser's
decision without independent evaluation.'2 9 The court reasoned that the
vicarious liability rule "meant to limit the [tangible employment action
affirmative defense] exception to those cases in which the harasser acts as
proved to be at fault through notice or knowledge").
122. 42 F. Supp. 2d 1254 (E.D. Okla. 1999).
123. Id. at 1256.
124. Id. at 1258 (quoting Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742,765 (1998)).
125. See id. at 1259 (asserting that "Dedner has not suffered a tangible employment
action sufficient enough to impose automatic liability on the state").
126. Llampallas v. Mini-Circuits Lab, 163 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 1998).
127. Id. at 1251.
128. I at 1249. The plaintiff was a lesbian whose supervisor was her former lover and
housemate. Id. at 1239-40. After the couple ended their sexual relationship, the supervisor
harassed the plaintiff, threatening to have her fired unless they resumed the affair. l The
supervisor called the company president and threatened to quit because she could no longer
work with the plaintiff. Id. at 1240. The president instead attempted to reassign the plaintiff
but ultimately terminated her. UL The court held that framing its analysis in terms of the
vicarious liability rule apparently renders inapplicable "disparate treatment" versus
"disparate impact." Id. at 1249.
129. Id.
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the decisionmaker with respect to the action. ' 3°
Similarly, in Montero v. AGCO Corp.,T3 the plaintiff filed a claim
against her employer, alleging that her supervisors and a co-worker had
subjected her to unwanted verbal and physical sexual behavior.132 The
plaintiff complained to a human resources manager only four months after
the harassment had stopped, and the employer promptly investigated and
disciplined the supervisors. 133 The district court granted the employer's
summary judgment motion, finding that it had established an affirmative
defense.'M
On appeal, the plaintiff claimed that, because she was constructively
discharged, she suffered a tangible employment action and, therefore, the
affirmative defense was unavailable. 35 The Ninth Circuit did not decide
whether constructive discharge constituted a tangible employment action;
however, it did find that since she resigned after the harassment had ended
and the employer disciplined the harassers, she was not constructively
discharged.136  Thus the Eleventh Circuit directly and Ninth Circuit
indirectly teach us that termination is an adverse employment action.
Not only did the circuit courts set a standard for when a tangible
employment action occurs, they also determined who bears the burden of
proof under the Burlington and Faragher vicarious liability rule. 37 The
Fifth Circuit appears to place the burden of proof regarding the existence of
a tangible employment action on the employer, stating that an employer
"can raise an affirmative defense to liability or damages, so long as it can
establish that the supervisor's harassment did not culminate in a 'tangible
employment action."",1
38
130. Id. at 1250 n.23.
131. 192 F.3d 856 (9th Cir. 1999).
132. Id. at 859.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 858.
135. Id. at 861.
136. Id.; see also Phillips v. Taco Bell Corp., 156 F.3d 884 (8th Cir. 1998) (failing to
reach the merits on plaintiff's claim that constructive discharge constitutes a tangible
employment action because it found that the plaintiff was not constructively discharged).
But see Caridad v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 191 F.3d 283 (2d Cir. 1999). The court
here held that constructive discharge does not constitute a tangible employment action under
Burlington and Faragher because "co-workers, as well as supervisors, can cause...
constructive discharge." Id. at 294. Also, in Burlington, where the plaintiff claimed
constructive discharge, the Supreme Court noted that "'Ellerth has not alleged she suffered a
tangible employment action. Id. at 295 (quoting Burlington, 524 U.S. 742, 766
(1998)).
137. Watts v. Kroger Co., 170 F.3d 505, 510 (5th Cir. 1999).
138. Id. at 509. The Fifth Circuit in Watts held that changing the plaintiff's work
schedule, expanding her duties to include mopping the floor and cleaning the toilets, and
requiring her to check with her supervisor before taking breaks did not constitute a tangible
employment action. Id. at 510.
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Conversely, although it did not reach the merits of employer liability,
the Sixth Circuit 39 indicated that the burden of proof of the existence of a
tangible employment action remained with the plaintiff, stating that "[i]f a
plaintiff can prove a tangible employment action, liability is automatic; if
however, there was [none], employers have an affirmative defense."' 4
Despite the apparent conflict between the Fifth and Sixth Circuit rulings,
one factor is clear: If an employer wants to use the affirmative defense,
there can be no tangible adverse employment action.
2. The Absence of Tangible Adverse Employment Action-The
Affirmative Defense
Once employers meet their burden of proof and can avail themselves
of the affirmative defense, the courts must then determine whether the
defense is satisfied.14 1 The lack of precedent and the fact-specific nature of
the affirmative defense makes post Burlington and Faragher case-law
illustrative for assessing employer liability. The affirmative defense has
two prongs: First, the employer must exercise reasonable care to prevent
and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and second, the
plaintiff employee must reasonably take advantage of any preventive or
corrective opportunities the employer provides.
1 42
With regard to the first prong, the employer's obligation to prevent
harassment largely rests on the implementation of an anti-discrimination
policy.1 43 The first prong of the affirmative defense is often, though not
necessarily, satisfied by the implementation of a sexual harassment policy
with a complaint procedure.' 44 It may also be satisfied by the prompt
investigation and remedying of any harassment of which the employer is
notified. -45 For example, the Northern District of Georgia1 46 found that "an
employer is insulated from liability under Title VII for a hostile
environment sexual harassment claim premised on constructive knowledge
of the harassment... [so long as] the employer has adopted an anti-
discrimination policy that is comprehensive, well-known to employees,
139. Williams v. Gen. Motors Corp., 187 F.3d 553 (6th Cir. 1999).
140. Id. at 561 n.2.
141. The affirmative defense has its limits. Courts generally have declined to extend the
affirmative defense to other circumstances or claims. See Lintz v. Am. Gen. Fin., Inc., 50 F.
Supp 2d. 1074, 1081 (D. Kan. 1999) (declining to extend the Burlington and Faragher
affirmative defense to a claim attempting to hold an employer liable under a negligence
theory); Laroche v. Denny's, Inc., 62 F. Supp 2d. 1375, 1383 (S.D. Fla. 1999) (declining to
extend the affirmative defense to public accommodation cases).
142. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998).
143. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 742, 808 (1998).
144. Id. at 808-09.
145. Burlington, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807-08.
146. Morgan v. Fellini's Pizza, Inc., 64 F. Supp. 2d 1304 (N.D. Ga. 1999).
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vigorously enforced, and provides alternative avenues of redress."'' 47 The
court nonetheless imposed liability because the employer's policy was
inadequate. 148  It only consisted of a few sentences within a general
employee policy, and managers did not review policies with new hires. 49
The Fourth Circuit reasoned in a comparable case that after Burlington
and Faragher, "the mere promulgation of... a [sexual harassment] policy
may well fail to satisfy the employer's burden."1 50 Absent evidence that a
policy was administered in bad faith or was otherwise defective, however,
"the existence of such a policy militates strongly in favor of' finding the
employer's actions reasonable.' 5'
Similarly, the Third Circuit held that the existence of a sexual
harassment policy was no longer an absolute defense to liability.5 2 The
court rejected the employer's argument that it was not liable because the
plaintiff failed to exhaust departmental mechanisms before suing. 53 The
court instead stated that "[a]n employer cannot 'use its own policies to
insulate itself from liability by placing an increased burden on a
complainant to provide notice beyond that required by law.""
' 54
The Third Circuit's ruling, however, should not be construed to give
employees absolute discretion in reporting harassment. An employee's
unreasonable failure to use the complaint mechanism will satisfy the
second prong of an employer's affirmative defense. The Seventh Circuit,
55
for example, required a plaintiff to report alleged harassment "'to someone
who could reasonably be expected to refer the complaint up the ladder to
the employee authorized to act on it.""
156
147. Id. at 1314 (citing Farley v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 115 F.3d 1548, 1554 (1 1th Cir.
1997).
148. Id. at 1211.
149. Id. at 1315.
150. Brown v. Perry, 184 F.3d 388, 396 (4th Cir. 1999).
151. Id. at 396.
152. Hurley v. Atlantic City Police Dept., 174 F.3d 95, 118 (3d Cir. 1999). A female
police sergeant brought sex discrimination charges against her employer for "longstanding
and egregious" conduct by her supervisors and co-workers, including sexual comments,
insults, and taunting, and exposure to demeaning and sexually explicit graffiti. Ia at 102-
05. Defendants appealed from a jury verdict in plaintiff's favor, and plaintiff appealed the
trial court's grant of summary judgment for one of the co-workers. Id. at 96.
153. Id. at 118.
154. Id. (quoting Williamson v. City of Houston, 148 F.3d 462, 467 (5th Cir. 1998)). In
dicta, the Hurley court also commented that the defense applies only to harassment
occurring outside the scope of employment. Id at 119 n.18. The court raised, but declined
to address, the issue of whether a jury might decide that "a patently ineffective harassment
policy [that] might communicate to male employees that harassment was an acceptable,
expected means to interact with female officers" justified holding the employer liable under
a scope of employment theory. Id.
155. Parkins v. Civil Constructors of M., Inc., 163 F.3d 1027 (7th Cir. 1997).
156. Id. at 1037 (citing Young v. Bayer Corp., 123 F.3d 672,675 (7th Cir. 1997).
2001] EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES LIABILITY
Even remoteness will not dilute an employee's obligation to report
sexual harassment. The Ninth Circuit rejected a plaintiff's claim that her
employer was prohibited from raising the affirmative defense because the
facility in which she worked was "isolated" geographically from the
company's higher management. 157 The court held in Faragher that the
plaintiff was not geographically isolated but, rather, that "the defendant's
organizational structure prevented the plaintiff from complaining directly
to higher management about the sexual harassment."'5 8 The Court declined
to recognize similar difficulties with the present plaintiffs circumstances.
Ultimately the second prong of the affirmative defense is often, though not
necessarily, met by demonstrating the employee's failure to follow the
complaint procedures established. 59
D. The Most Recent Evolution: Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products,
Inc.
On June 12, 2000, the Supreme Court expanded employer liability
beyond the new vicarious liability rule found in the Burlington and
Faragher sexual harassment cases. 16  The Reeves decision, an age
discrimination case, gives a new dimension to employers' total
discrimination liability.' 6' Where Burlington and Faragher created a new
157. Montero v. AGCO Corp., 192 F.3d 856, 863 (9th Cir. 1999).
158. Id. at 864 n.6.
159. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998); Faragher v. City of
Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807-08 (1998).
160. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 830 U.S. 133 (2000).
161. Reeves was a 57 year old supervisor who had ongoing disputes with his manager
over Reeves' performance, which led to Reeves' termination. Id. at 137-38. Management
claimed Reeves' failure to maintain accurate attendance records for his department was the
basis for his termination. Id. The employer presented evidence at trial to that effect. Id.
Reeves countered that this explanation was pretext for age discrimination, and introduced
evidence that he had accurately recorded the attendance of his employees. Id. Reeves also
introduced evidence of his supervisor's age-based hostility in his dealings with Reeves,
including statements made by the manager to Reeves that he was "too damn old to do [his]
job." Id. at 151. The jury found that the age discrimination was intentional, and awarded
him both compensatory and punitive/liquidated damages, plus two years of front pay
totaling approximately $100,000. Id.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the trial court, finding
that, as a matter of law, Reeves had not introduced sufficient evidence to sustain the jury's
finding of discrimination. Id. Upon further review, the Supreme Court reinstated the trial
jury's award. Id. at 153-54. The significance of the case is in the newly articulated
evidentiary standard that the Supreme Court placed on businesses to produce a legitimate,
non-biased reason for termination of the older worker that the jury finds to be credible. See
Hyman Lovitz & Sidney L. Gold, Reeves Decision Limits Summary Judgment, Does Not
Require Direct Evidence in ADEA Cases, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, July 20, 2000, at 5
(commenting that Reeves held an employer's articulated reason for the adverse employment
action may no longer be given credence on summary judgment, "if the plaintiff either
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standard for employer vicarious liability, Reeves creates a new standard for
employer pretext. 162  Before Reeves, an employee bore the burden of
proving, first, that the employer's stated basis for a tangible adverse
employment action was false and, second, that the actual basis was
discrimination. 63 The precedent before Reeves set a standard of employer
liability that left room for pretext and mixed motive without damages
owed.' 64
The Reeves decision, however, changes the standard by holding
employers liable even without undisputed proof of additional independent
evidence of illegal motive.16' An employer now virtually loses the ability
to make a successful motion for summary judgment because an employee
need only establish a prima facie case and a jury question in order to
survive. 66 While Reeves does not address vicarious liability, it does create
a new level of employer liability by lowering the plaintiffs burden of
proof. The Reeves holding, therefore, further evinces how the standard for
employer's discrimination liability is continually evolving to stricter and
more stringent levels.
presents evidence that contradicts the decision-maker, or introduces evidence that
impeaches the decision-maker").
162. The practical implications of the Reeves decision are that it will make it very
difficult for corporate defendants to win a contested age discrimination case "as a matter of
law" by appealing to the Judge's finding of "no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a
reasonable jury to find" for the plaintiff under Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. FED. R. Civ. P. 50. Any case that ends up in the lap of a jury has a reasonable
chance for a sympathetic finder of fact to determine intentional discrimination and award
punitive damages. As noted by an experienced employment attorney, "Juries will now be
able to guess about an employer's motivation for its treatment of its employees. It also
means that the federal anti-bias laws have the effect of being civility codes for the
workplace"'. Tony Mauro, Direct Proof of Intent Not Necessary in Job Discrimination
Suits, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, June 13, 2000, at 4 (quoting Philip Berkowitz, a partner in the
New York office of Salans, Hertzfeld, Heilbronn, Christy & Viener); see also Peter N.
Hillman, Risks of Discrimination Suits Increase for Employers Following Supreme Court
Ruling in Reeves, 14 EMP. LIT. REP. 3 (2000) (commenting that juries will have a much
increased role in the resolution of ADEA cases).
163. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 148.
164. Id.
165. Id. The Supreme Court's guidelines as articulated in Reeves are:
In appropriate circumstances, the trier of fact can reasonably infer from the
falsity of the explanation that the employer is dissembling to cover up a
discriminatory purpose.... Moreover, once the employer's justification has
been eliminated, discrimination may well be the most likely alternative
explanation, especially since the employer is in the best position to put forth the
actual reason for its decision.
Id. at 147.
166. Id.
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E. The Resulting Standard of Employer Liability
In the aftermath of Burlington and Faragher and Reeves, several
standards exist for employer liability. First, employers remain strictly
liable in cases where the discrimination can be attributed directly to the
employer.
67
Additionally, a new standard for employer liability now holds
employers strictly vicariously liable for sexual harassment by supervisors,
subject to the affirmative defense. 6' To determine whether employers are
liable, the fundamental question is whether the harassment has resulted in a
tangible employment action. 169  If a tangible employment action has
resulted, the employer cannot assert the affirmative defense, thereby
creating strict liability.170 If the discrimination does not culminate in a
tangible employment action, but the discrimination is severe and pervasive,
then the employer is vicariously liable, subject to the affirmative defense.'
71
Within this new standard come new implications for damages. In
Deffenbaugh-Williams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,172 the Fifth Circuit
extended the vicarious liability reasoning to allow vicarious liability for
punitive damages. ' 3 The Eleventh Circuit'74 declined to follow the trend,
noting that "Faragher, which was not about punitive damages .... [should
not] overrule our pre-Faragher, punitive damages precedent" requiring that
an employer must be proved to be at fault through notice or knowledge.
175
In the 1999 case of Kolstad v. American Dental Assoc., 7 6 the Supreme
Court addressed employers' punitive damage liability in discrimination
cases. The Kolstad Court held that an employer may be vicariously liable
167. Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 70-71 (1986). There is also a
standard for co-worker sexual harassment. It is used when an employer is only liable for its
negligence in allowing the harassment-if it knew or should have known of a co-worker's
harassment, yet allowed it to occur. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1604.11(c), 1606.8(c)(2000). Co-worker
harassment is beyond the scope of this paper and is therefore not addressed.
168. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998); Faragher v. City of
Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807-08 (1998); 29 C.F.R. §§ 1604.11 (c), 1606.8(c) (stating that
in sexual harassment and national origin cases, employers are liable regardless of whether
the discriminatory acts were "authorized or even forbidden by the employer and regardless
of whether the employer knew or should have known" of their existence).
169. Burlington, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807-08.
170. Burlington, 524 U.S. at 753, 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807-08.
171. Burlington, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807-08.
172. 156 F.3d 581 (5th Cir. 1998).
173. Id. at 592-93.
174. Dudley v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 166 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 1999).
175. Id. at 1323 n.8.
176. Kolstad v. Am. Dental Assoc., 527 U.S. 526 (1999); see also Dick v. NY Life Ins.
Co., 359 U.S. 437 (1959); Winter, supra note 3, at BIO (discussing the vicarious liability
standard's effect, which has increased punitive damages awards and thus expanded EPLI
insurance coverage).
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for punitive damages even in the absence of egregious conduct on the
employer's part.' 77 Kolstad significantly increases the financial incentive
on employers to control discriminatory behavior. By inflicting punitive
damages on employers who are merely vicariously liable, the Court is
telling employers that their oversight responsibilities are paramount.
The increased risk Kolstad created is offset by a safe harbor.178 The
safe harbor prevents the imposition of vicarious liability for punitive
damages if the employer demonstrates a good faith attempt to comply with
Title VII.179 Relying on the Kolstad safe harbor, the Northern District of
Illinois rejected a plaintiffs prayer for punitive damages.' 80 It determined
that the employer had a non-discrimination and anti-harassment policy in
effect during the plaintiffs employment, under which it was a violation to
sexually harass or discriminate against another employee.'8' The policy
designated the proper steps an employee could take to report harassment
and discrimination. 18 2 The plaintiff received a copy of the policy, attended
a training session where the policy was covered and yet never complained
about sexual harassment to management or to the human resources
department.
183
While Kolstad's safe harbor may not be an actual affirmative defense,
it may still result in increased coverage under EPLI policies.' 84 So long as
punitive damages are only imposed vicariously, they are insurable in most
states.' 85 Eighteen states do not allow coverage for punitive damages,
177. Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 538.
178. Id. at 544-46.
179. Id. While agency principles may allow for the imposition of punitive damages for
even those employers who make every effort to comply with Title VII, only those
employers who have not made such a good faith effort should bear liability. Id. Otherwise,
employers would have the "perverse incentive" to avoid implementation of anti-
discrimination programs, thereby undermining Title VII's goal of preventing workplace
discrimination. Id. at 545.
180. Hull v. APCOA/Standard Parking Corp., 82 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 247, 257
(N.D. Ill. 2000), available at No. 99 C 2832, 2000 WL 198881 (N.D. IlI. Feb. 14, 2000).
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Winter, supra note 3, at B12.
185. The following jurisdictions have determined that vicarious liability for punitive
damages are insurable: HAW. REV. STAT. § 431:10-240 (West Supp. 2000); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 40-2 (West Supp. 1999); VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-227 (West Supp. 2000); Ridgway v.
Gulf Life Ins. Co., 578 F.2d 1026 (5th Cir. 1978); Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Welfare Fin. Co., 75
F.2d 58 (8th Cir. 1934); In re Celotex Corp., 152 B.R. 652 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1993); United
States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Open Sesame Child Care Ctr., 819 F. Supp. 756 (N.D. Ill. 1993);
Pennbank v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 669 F. Supp. 122 (W.D. Pa. 1987); Grant v. N.
River Ins. Co., 453 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Ind. 1978); S. Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., v. Daniel,
440 S.W.2d 582 (Ark. 1969); Price v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 502 P.2d 522 (Ariz.
1972); City Prods. Corp. v. Globe Indem. Co., 88 Cal. App. 3d 31 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979);
Salus Corp. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 478 A.2d 1067 (D.C. App. 1984); Greenwood Cemetery,
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generally but eleven of those eighteen states allow coverage for punitive
damages if the underlying liability is vicarious. 86 It follows that over forty
states permit employers to insure against some form of punitive damages.
Employer liability for discrimination has evolved and increased
greatly in recent years.1 7 Meritor exploded the boundaries of what
constitutes sexual harassment by recognizing hostile work environment
claims.' Burlington and Faragher dramatically lowered the threshold for
employer liability by holding employers vicariously liable for sexual
harassment by supervisors, absent an affirmative defense.'89 Kolstad
allowed the imposition of punitive damages when an employer is merely
vicariously liable for sexual harassment. Finally, Reeves greatly hinders an
employer's ability to escape a claim based on pretext. This evolution
reflects both judicial and Congressional efforts to create an increasingly
strict standard that employers must meet to avoid damages.
The evolution toward a stricter liability standard is designed to
increase employers' financial incentive to curb discriminatory behavior.
While the courts have not expressly stated that this incentive is non-
delegable, it is a reasonable inference that transferring the risk of damages
dilutes the incentive. Employers are, not surprisingly, hesitant to bear the
financial liability alone. The desire to offset that liability has created an
entirely new market of risk transference despite the courts' efforts to
financially motivate employers' behavior.
Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 232 S.E.2d 910 (Ga. 1977); Abbie Uriguen Oldsmobile Buick,
Inc. v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 511 P.2d 783 (Idaho 1973); Skyline Harvestore Sys., Inc.
v. Centennial Ins. Co., 331 N.W.2d 106 (Iowa 1983); Cont. Ins. Cos. v. Hancock, 507
S.W.2d 146 (Ky. 1973); Owens v. Anderson, 631 So.2d 1313 (La. Ct. App. 1994); First
Nat'l Bank v. Fid. & Deposit Co., 389 A.2d 359 (Md. 1978); Anthony v. Frith, 394 So.2d
867 (Miss. 1981); Fitzgerald v. W. Fire Ins. Co., 679 P.2d 790 (Mont. 1984); Am. Home
Assurance Co. v. Fish, 451 A.2d 358 (N.H. 1982); LoRocco v. N.J. Mfrs. Indem. Ins. Co.,
197 A.2d 591 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1980); Dayton Hudson Corp. v. Am. Mut. Liab.
Ins. Co., 621 P.2d 1155 (Okla. 1980); Baker v. Armstrong, 744 P.2d 170 (N.M. 1987);
Harrell v. Travelers Indem. Co., 567 P.2d 1013 (Or. 1977); Lazenby v. Universal
Underwriters Inc. Co., 383 S.W.2d 1 (Tenn. 1964); State v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 404 A.2d
101 (Vt. 1979); Hensely v. Erie Ins. Co., 283 S.E 2d 227 (W. Va. 1981); see also Osterage
& Newman, INS. COVERAGE DIsPuTES, § 14.06 (10th ed. 1999).
186. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-2; VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-227; Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 75
F.2d 58; Celotex, 152 B.R. 652; Open Sesame Child Care Ctr., 819 F. Supp. 756;
Pennbank, 669 F. Supp. 122; Grant, 453 F. Supp. 1361; City Prods. Corp., 88 Cal. App. 3d
31; Cont'l Ins. Cos., 507 S.W.2d 146; LoRocco, 197 A.2d 591; Dayton Hudson Corp., 621
P.2d 1155.
187. See supra notes 148-52 and accompanying text.
188. MeritorSav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986).
189. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998); Faragher v. City of
Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807-08 (1998).
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III. THE EVOLUTION OF EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES LIABILITY INSURANCE
Employment Practices Liability Insurance developed as a byproduct
of commercial general liability ("CGL") and Directors and Officers
("D&O") insurance. 90 CGL and D&O insurance policies strictly excluded
most employment lawsuits.' 91 Insurers, however, designed EPLI to be a
gap-filler that would specifically cover employment claims. EPLI is a
relatively young product, dating only to the early 1980s when NAS
Insurance Services, through Lloyd's of London, introduced an Employer's
Legal Expense Reimbursement Policy. 193 In the early 1990s, carriers began
introducing their own EPLI products in increasing numbers. 94 As recently
as 1994, only three insurance companies offered EPLI policies, whereas
current estimates suggest that more than seventy companies market
EPLI' 95 Industry analysts report that currently EPLI sales are growing by
approximately ten percent per month.196 It is estimated that more than half
of Fortune 500 companies have purchased EPLI coverage.1
97
Insurers' initial offerings shared significant similarities, with most
providing coverage for employment law judgments, bonds, and post-
judgment interest.' 98 All carriers also covered back pay, but coverage was
narrow.' 99 Typical policies excluded coverage for fines and penalties, with
all but one carrier excluding punitive damages. z °  Virtually all carriers
excluded intentional acts, rendering moot any debate over whether
insurance coverage should exist for employment claims involving punitive
190. Nadel, supra note 5, at 2275.
191. Rosemary A. Macero & Lucy Halatyn, Employer Beware: Do You Have Insurance
Coverage for Employment Claims?, 602 PRACTICING L. INST. LITIG. & ADMIN. PRACTICE
COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 399, 421 (1999); Nadel, supra note 5, at 2275.
192. Macero & Halatyn, supra note 191, at 421; Winter, supra note 3, at B1O.
193. See Sandra Jane Meindersma, Employers Under Fire: Managing Employment
Practice Liability, RISK MGMT., Jan. 1, 1996, at 25.
194. Robert A. Machson & Joseph P. Monteleone, Insurance Coverage for Wrongful
Employment Practices Claims Under Various Liability Policies, 49 Bus. LAW 689 (Feb.
1999).
195. Brenda Paik Sunoo, After Everything Else-Buy Insurance, PERSONNEL J., Oct. 1,
1998, at 45; Insurers Offer Harassment Coverage, AOL NEws, Mar. 23, 1999 (quoting the
Associated Press).
196. Nadel, supra note 5, at 2276; see also Jeffrey P. Klenk, Emerging Coverage Issues
in Employment Practices Liability Insurance: The Industry Perspective on Recent
Developments, 21 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 323, 323 (1999) (stating EPLI "has become the
hottest selling, most talked about insurance product today").
197. Louis Pechman, Employment Practices Insurance Proliferates, N.Y. L. J., May 26,
1998, at 1.
198. Gordon M. Park & Michele F. Lyerly, Employment Practices Liability Policy: Real
Cure or Costly Placebo, 29 BRIEF 38, 38 (1999).
199. Id.
200. See Klenk, supra note 196, at 325 (stating that the insurance industry did not
develop a comprehensive and saleable EPLI product until 1996).
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damages.201
Increased market competition in recent years resulted in significant
product differentiation.20 2 "Enhanced" EPLI policies emerged covering
various forms of discrimination, sexual harassment, wrongful discharge,
defamation, and negligent hiring.2 °3 EPLI carriers offered catastrophic
coverage, higher coverage limits, and coverage for punitive damages where
state law allowed.2 04  The buyer's market has also led to less stringent
underwriting requirements. 205 The expansion in EPLI coverage has been
driven primarily by anxious employers seeking new ways to cover their
ever-increasing risk of employment-related liability.
26
201. Meindersma, supra note 193, at 25.
202. See Gary Griffin & Rachel McKinney, Employment Practices Liability Insurance:
Building a Three-Legged Stool of Protection (Aug. 27, 1999), available at
http://www.imms.com/consultantlIMS6370.htm (noting both that "the number of insurers
offering such coverage has increased dramatically" and "there is much variation in the
degree of protection offered" by "the wide variation in EPLI policy forms"). See generally
Seth B. Schafler, Sea of EPLI Confusion (Aug. 27, 1999), available at
http:llwww.proskauer.comlpubs/articles.epli.html (reprinted with permission of RISK & INS.
MAG., Apr. 1, 1999) (asserting that "[t]he profusion and vagueness of many EPLI policy
forms create a serious risk" for those considering coverage).
203. See, e.g., Executive Risk Enhances EPLI Coverage, PR NEwswiRE, Jan. 14, 1999
(quoting one insurer's director of product management: "Traditional EPLI policies do not
respond to these claims [of sexual harassment], but ours will."); Hartford Expands EPLI
Coverage, BEST'S INS. NEwS, Nov. 12, 1999 ("Hartford... has expanded its... [EPLI] to
cover several new areas, such as intentional acts and emotional distress.... Highlights of
Hartford's revamped EPLI coverage include coverage for damages, such as judgments,
settlements, awards, and compensatory damages, as well as claim expenses such as defense
costs and related expenses.").
204. See ISO Introduces First Standardized Insurance Program for Employment
Practices Liability (Mar. 23, 2001), available at http:llwww.iso.comldocs/presO46.htm. The
Insurance Services Office, Inc. ("ISO"), the country's largest provider of property/casualty
information services, introduced the first standardized insurance program for employee
lawsuits for discrimination. ISO filed its Employment-Related Practices Liability Program
with state insurance regulators for approval. Id. The ISO policy covers employers' liability
for claims arising out of an injury to an employee because of an employment-related
offense, as well as providing legal defense for the insured. Id. Injury may result from
discrimination that results in refusal to hire; failure to promote; termination; demotion;
discipline or defamation. Id. Injury also can include coercion of an employee to perform an
unlawful act; work-related sexual harassment; or verbal, physical, mental or emotion abuse.
Id.
The ISO program excludes: (1) criminal, fraudulent or malicious acts; (2) violations
of the accommodations requirement of the Americans with Disabilities Act; (3) liability of
the perpetrator of sexual harassment; and (4) injury arising out of strikes and lock-outs,
employment termination from specified business decisions and retaliatory actions taken
against "whistle blowers." Id.; see also David M. Katz, $100 Suits Fuel Market for Bias,
Harassment Coverage, NAT'L UNDERWRITER, PROP. & CAS.-RISK & BENEFITS MGMT., Apr.
8, 1996, 1:11 (discussing EPLI programs or various carriers).
205. More EPLI Options Help Cut Law Firms HR-Related Risks, COMP. & BENEFITS FOR
L. OFFIcEs, May 1999, at2.
206. Id.; Griffin & McKinney, supra, note 202 (asserting that "over the last twenty years,
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Fearing exploding liability for employment claims,2 °7 employers
justify this greater transfer of risk to third-party insurers by noting that
employment law has made them more and more liable for acts less and less
within their direct control.2 08 Amidst these changes in the EPLI market, the
question arises whether the growing liability for employment
discrimination claims should be managed by allowing employers simply to
shift the risk of their liability to an insurance carrier. Even ignoring the
increasing standards of employer liability, the question remains significant
because by offsetting the risk, employers are offsetting the primary
financial incentive to control discriminatory conduct.2°  If met with
widespread adoption, the emerging trend toward removal of exclusions
from EPLI coverage ' ° would reduce, if not eliminate, the law's primary
purpose: To "provide the spur or catalyst which causes employers.., to
self-examine and to self-evaluate their employment practices and to
endeavor to eliminate [discrimination]. 2 2 '
IV. HAS EMPLOYER LIABILITY EVOLVED To CONFLICT WITH EPLI?
Congress enacted an antidiscrimination scheme that is more complex
than the simple division between compensatory and punitive damages.
Discrimination law has evolved to include damage awards with the
expressed goal that potential liability for damages would encourage
wrongful employment practice claims have risen at a rate eighteen times faster than the
proliferation of the [flederal [c]ourt docket").
207. Employers cite the doubling of sexual harassment cases filed with the EEOC
between 1991 and 1996. See U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, STRATEGIC
PLAN, 1997-2002 (1997), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/plan/plan.html. They also
predict that race, sex, disability or age discrimination claims will number over 26,000 per
year by the end of the century. See U.S. Equal Opportunity Employment Commission,
NAT'L ENFORCEMENT PLAN (1997), available at http:llwww.eeoc.gov/nep.html; see also
Griffin & McKinney, supra note 202.
208. See infra Part I.C.1 & 2.
209. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 756 (1998)(stating that "[slexual
harassment under Title VII presupposes intentional conduct"); Michael Sirignano, Though
Courts Often Deny Coverage of Sexual Harassment Claims, Insurers Face Many
Challenges (Aug. 27, 1999), available at http://www.rivkinradler.com/ms120398.html
(noting that "[t]ypically, the underlying causes of action asserted against an individual
harasser include allegations grounded in intentional conduct" and that some courts have
placed sexual harassment into a category of wrongs that they find "to be intentional acts as a
matter of law, regardless of whether the insured subjectively intended to cause harm"); see
also Coit Drapery Cleaners, Inc. v. Sequoia Ins. Co., 14 Cal. App. 4th 1595, 1614 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1993) ("[Sexual harassment] is always intentional, it is always wrongful, and it is
always harmful.") (citing J.C. Penney Casualty Ins. Co. v. K.K., 52 Cal.3d. 1009, 1025
(1991) (emphasis omitted).
210. Klenk, supra note 196, at 333-35.
211. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-18 (1975) (quoting United
States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 379 (8th Cir. 1973)).
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employers to deter discriminatory conduct.212 The courts interpreting the
legislative scheme have lowered the threshold of employer liability to
maximize the deterrent effect.213 By allowing employers to transfer
liability for discrimination, EPLI dilutes the deterrent goals of employment
discrimination law214 and weakens the newly evolved standard of employer
liability for harassment and discrimination.15 This section examines the
possible effect of EPLI on employment law by analyzing whether
employers who obtain EPLI coverage are, in effect, able to avoid the post
Burlington/Faragher liability standard. We then propose a preventive
program designed to allow appropriate risk-shifting in a manner that retains
the positive impacts of EPLI while minimizing effects that belie the
liability standard courts have imposed.
A. Does EPLI Undermine Post Burlington/Faragher Employer Liability?
Employers who intentionally discriminate against a particular
employee or employees are assessed damages not only to compensate
victims, but also to punish, and thereby deter future instances of such
conduct.2 1 6 Although the scope of EPLI coverage varies with the insurer
and includes some coverage for intentional acts, EPLI typically does not
cover truly intentional discrimination.21 7 When an employer engages in
conduct evincing specific intent, "[the conduct] ... would be intentional,
illegal, and hence, not insurable. 2 8
On the other end of the spectrum are cases of truly unintentional
212. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 805-06 (1998); Gallagher, supra
note 20, at 1273.
213. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 805-06; Burlington, 524 U.S. at 765.
214. Gallagher, supra note 20, at 1266-74, 1270 n.60 (quoting Steven L. Willbom,
Insurance, Public Policy, and Employment Discrimination, 66 MINN. L. REv. 1003, 1009
(1982)) ("Insurance [for intentional discrimination] would undermine the deterrent effect of
damages. Hence, to preserve the deterrent effect, [public policy] prohibits insurance for
such liability.").
215. Gallagher, supra note 20, at 1266-74; Macero & Halatyn, supra note 191, at 425
(noting that "public policy goals seem to conflict with the scope of available coverage under
EPLI which, by its terms, defines actions which have previously [been] determined by
various courts to constitute intentional conduct"); see also Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 697,
Eveleth v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 515 N.W.2d 576 (Minn. 1994) (discussing
coverage for intentional discrimination).
216. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 805-06.
217. Macero & Halatyn, supra note 191, at 421-22, 424.
218. Steven R. Goldstein & Amy R. Stein, Is Employment Policy Liability Insurance
Against Public Policy?, C.P.C.U. J., Oct. 1, 1998 ("Since there have been few, if any,
judicial decisions interpreting the terms and conditions of EPLI policies, it is unclear
whether or not the courts will find certain provisions.., against public policy."); see also
Lorelie S. Masters, Protection from the Storm: Insurance Coverage for Employment
Liability, 53 Bus. LAw. 1249, 1263 (1998).
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discrimination. 2 9 The essence of such a claim is a statistically recognized
negative effect upon one particular protected class of people-an effect that
220is not satisfactorily explained by the employer. Unintentional
discrimination is analogous to negligence, which is covered by EPLI.22'
EPLI coverage of unintentional and unknowing acts of discrimination is
not problematic. Retaining EPLI coverage would not be a primary (or even
secondary) motivator for employers' behavior because unintentional
discrimination occurs, by definition, without any active involvement of
management.222
In the middle of the spectrum lies EPLI coverage for vicarious liability
claims. Vicarious liability claims do not involve the creation of statistical
imbalances in treatment of a class, but rather involve a tangible
employment action or a hostile working environment. 223  The Supreme
Court's most recent decisions make employers vicariously liable for
harassment or discrimination, subject only to an affirmative defense or safe
harbor.224 In June of 2000, the Supreme Court further enhanced employer
liability by making it easier for a plaintiff to meet his or her burden in a
mixed motive case.22' EPLI coverage may undermine the Supreme Court's
standard for employer liability in all such harassment and discrimination
cases.
For example, in sexual harassment cases, the Supreme Court has
iterated a standard that imposes liability when a company's employees or
agents sexually harass other employees. In such harassment cases,
employers are accorded "imputed" or "vicarious" liability.226 Courts have
imputed liability to employers in cases of sexual harassment by supervisors
on longstanding principles of agency law: Employers bear responsibility
for their agents' intentional torts because the law presumes that employers
227are in the best position to control their agents. Therefore, from a
preventive standpoint, the law seeks to ensure through monetary motivation
228that employers take affirmative steps to deter sexual harassment.
219. Macero & Halatyn, supra note 191, at 404-05,409.
220. See, e.g., Griggs v Duke Power Co, 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971); Macero & Halatyn,
supra note 191, at 404-05, 409.
221. Nadel, supra note 5, at 2276.
222. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
223. California Supreme Court Limits Job Discrimination Liability, UNDERWRITER'S
WIRE (Aug. 27, 1999), available at http://www.uwreport.comwire/news/0798/0723job.htm
[hereinafter UW WIRE]. "Harassment claims are legitimately distinguished from
discrimination claims because they are based on different types of conduct." Id.
224. Kolstad v. Am. Dental Assoc., 527 U.S. 526 (1999); Faragher v. City of Boca
Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
225. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prod.'s, Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000).
226. Burlington, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807-08.
227. Burlington, 524 U.S. at 752-64.
228. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 805-06.
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In 1999, the Supreme Court went beyond sexual harassment issues
when it decided the Kolstad case. The Kolstad Court found that an
employer could be vicariously liable for punitive damages for
discrimination in general.2 9 Appellate and district courts interpreting
Kolstad have supported the holding by awarding punitive damages based
on vicarious liability even in the absence of egregious conduct. 30
Employers are troubled by the vicarious liability standard. They fear
the risk of money damages and the substantial investigative burden
mandated in order to benefit from the affirmative defense. Employers are
turning to EPLI carriers for coverage and risk transference. 3 1
Unfortunately, the financial incentive to control negative conduct is fragile
and easily weakened. EPLI may undermine the deterrence incentive
because coverage for imputed liability is permissible in most states.32
When the transfer of liability to an EPLI carrier lessens the incentive to
control discrimination, the existence of EPLI coverage contravenes the
newly evolved employer liability standard. Where employers can shift the
risk of financial loss to a third-party insurer, insured employers might
ignore the burden imposed by the Supreme Court, thereby allowing sexual
harassment to continue.33 EPLI insurers have no legal obligation to deny
coverage to employers at risk for discrimination2 4 The premiums charged
to high risk employers may not create enough positive incentive to deter
discrimination as effectively as damages would.*23  Therefore, absent
exclusions for imputed liability claims, EPLI coverage dilutes the courts'
effort to use the liability standard as an incentive to purge workplace
229. Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 537.
230. Winter, supra note 3, at BI0; see EEOC v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 187 F.3d 1241
(10th Cir. 1999); Smith v. Pepersack, 194 F.3d 1305 (4th Cir. 1999); Deffenbaugh-Williams
v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 156 F.3d 581 (5th Cir. 1998); EEOC v. Orkin Exterminating Co.,
63 F. Supp 2d. 684 (D. Md. 1999); Hipp v. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 65 F. Supp. 1314
(M.D. Fla. 1999); Greenbaum v. Handelsbanken, 67 F. Supp. 228 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Woods
v. Am. Eagle Outfitters, No. 98-71731, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14455 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 31,
1999). But see lacobucci v. Bouleter, 193 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 1999); Olsen v. Marriott Int'l,
75 F. Supp 2d. 1052 (D. Ariz. Nov. 22, 1999) (finding no liability for punitive damages
under Kolstad).
231. Nadel, supra note 5, at 2275.
232. Winter, supra note 3, at B0.
233. See UW WIRE, supra note 223. Discussing the ramifications for the state insurance
industry of the California Supreme Court's decision in Reno v. Baird, 957 P.2d 1333 (1998),
which ruled that workers cannot sue supervisors individually for workplace discrimination,
one attorney noted that "[i]f managers are aware that they have no personal risk from
discriminating, they are going to do it more." UW WIRE, supra note 223. This rather
logical conclusion is analogous to the argument that if employers bear no financial
responsibility for their agents' sexual harassment (because they can transfer the risk to a
third-party insurer), they will be less diligent in policing their agents' conduct.
234. See id.
235. Id.
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discrimination.
The question then arises whether such contravention of the employer
standard should be allowed. EPLI carriers suggest that their products have
a positive impact.2 36 Many EPLI carriers encourage preventive measures in
line with those the Supreme Court outlined by engaging in rigorous
237underwriting procedures before granting coverage. Because many
insurers lack historical data with which to determine premiums in the EPLI
arena, they rely instead on the application process to determine the level of
risk presented by potential insureds.23 s Insurers require applicants to
examine their anti-discrimination policies and procedures, and often insist
on a full-scale audit of the company's human resources practices.239 Some
insurers offering EPLI have denied coverage to applicants who do not have
in place adequate anti-discrimination preventive procedures.2
John Kuhn, Vice President at Chubb & Sons, Inc., one of the first
major carriers to enter the EPLI market and currently one of the largest
241sellers of EPLI, maintains that the rigorous application process benefits
companies seeking coverage because it requires human resources
departments to "[take care of] those things they knew they had to do but
hadn't gotten around to. 2 42 Proponents assert that EPLI furthers the goal
of employment discrimination laws because the underwriting procedures
force employers to be in legal compliance to obtain coverage. 43 Although
the EPLI market remains too new to offer hard data, carriers present
anecdotal evidence that those employers who pass the examination process
and obtain coverage have fewer claims of discrimination than those who do
236. Nadel, supra note 5, at 2276 (quoting John Kuhn).
237. Masters, supra note 218, at 1275-76; Joseph P. Monteleone, Insuring tile
Uninsurable: Policies to Cover Workplace Discrimination and Sexual Harassment
Liabilities, METRO. CORP. COUNS., May 1999, at 62.
238. Monteleone, supra note 237, at 62.
239. Masters, supra note 218, at 1275-76. A full scale audit includes an assessment of
prior claims, employment documentation including evaluations, interviews of officers,
composition of work force, human resources manuals, sexual harassment policies and
procedures, termination procedures, post termination procedures, testing, training and
overall practices and procedures. Id.
240. Nadel, supra note 5, at 2276.
241. Id.; Dorothy Elizabeth Brooks, Employers Insuring Against Employees' Lawsuits,
ATLANTA Bus. CHRON. (Mar. 13-19, 1998), at 13B, available at
http://atlanta.bcentral.com/atlanta/stories/1998103/16/focus8.html.
242. Nadel, supra note 5, at 2276 (quoting John Kuhn).
243. See, e.g., Griffin & McKinney, supra note 202. "Employment practices liability
insurance (EPLI) can augment [the] traditional preventive tactics [of 'communication of the
employer's rules, policies, and procedures to the employees, as well as early intervention in
employment disputes or complaints']. Combined with insurance, loss prevention [and]
post-incident investigation and thorough follow-up can act to form a three-legged stool of
protection against employment-related claims." Id.
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not.244 But can EPLI retain positive legal and economic effects while only
allowing an appropriate level of risk?
B. A Proposed Solution
When the Supreme Court affirmed in its Burlington/Faragher
decisions that employers are vicariously liable for supervisor sexual
harassment, it also established an affirmative defense that insulates
employers from imputed liability.24' To establish an effective affirmative
defense, employers must exercise reasonable care to prevent and promptly
correct discrimination, take no job-related action against victims of
discrimination, and include safeguards for employees reporting
discriminatory behavior.246
The affirmative defense elements outlined by the Supreme Court are
instructive in addressing the proper scope of EPLI coverage. Incorporation
of the affirmative defense elements into EPLI carriers' underwriting
guidelines begets a solution to EPLI's contravention of the newly evolved
employer standard. Currently, insurers' incorporation of these elements
into their underwriting guidelines is merely an economically sound
business practice. However, an economic motivation absent the force of
law is tenuous and easily diluted. Nothing would prevent insurers from
forgoing stringent underwriting requirements completely if a cost-benefit
analysis indicated that such requirements are no longer economically
necessary.
State insurance regulators or state legislators could respond by
requiring EPLI carriers to institute anti-discriminatory practices as a pre-
condition to coverage. Requiring carriers to include in their underwriting
guidelines the preventive measures embodied by the Court's affirmative
defense would transform a mere business practice into a legal duty. In this
way, state lawmakers make insurers, to whom EPLI shifts the risk of
financial liability for harassment and discrimination, also accept
responsibility to ensure that employers are encouraged to prevent wrongful
behavior. Allowing employers to shift the financial risk of liability to a
third-party insurer weakens the incentive to prevent discrimination, thus
contravening the intent of the vicarious liability standard. But requiring
insurers to determine that employers do, in fact, take affirmative steps to
prevent discrimination strengthens the law's aim of deterring
244. Monteleone, supra note 237, at 62.
245. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998); Faragher v. City of
Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807-08 (1998).
246. Burlington, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807-08; Marc R. Engel,
Millenium Resolution: Reduce Your Risk of Employment-Related Litigation, 4 EMP. L.
STRATEGIST 1 (Aug. 1999).
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discriminatory conduct. 47 Thus, allowing EPLI coverage for employers'
"imputed liability" based on the actions of their agents does not threaten
the standard, as long as an appropriate preventive program as outlined
above is in force.
V. CONCLUSION
Most employers consider it in their interest to eliminate discrimination
from the workplace, if only because this type of misconduct leads to
unhappy and less productive workers. 8 As Congress and the courts have
recognized, employers are driven primarily by economic motives.2 49 Thus,
the law has evolved to focus on deterring discrimination via the increased
risk of liability.250 Indeed, "because vigilant efforts to stamp out all
discriminatory conduct can be costly, the additional financial incentive of
avoiding liability... motivate[s] employers to take even greater steps to
ensure that they are not found negligent in their efforts to prevent
[discrimination] if the liability avoided is greater than the added
expense. '"2' By providing a less-expensive means of avoiding liability than
assuming the cost of establishing and ensuring nondiscriminatory practices,
EPLI may remove the financial incentive of avoiding liability and thus may
limit employers' motivation to behave in a nondiscriminatory manner.
State lawmakers could relieve the conflict between a strong financial
incentive for employers and EPLI's ability to weaken that incentive.
Regulators could require underwriting guidelines on par with the
affirmative defense as a pre-condition for coverage. A regulatory
prescription retains the newly evolved employer liability standard, salvages
the economic motivation for employers to affirmatively deter sexual
harassment discrimination and casts EPLI in the positive role of assisting
the law's goal rather than undermining it.
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